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Article 3

EQUALITY AND THE CITIZENS OF SISTER STATES
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK*

Professor Laycock's commentary is written in response to Lea
Brilmayer's article in this edition. Brilmayer and Laycock agree
that states owe equal treatment to citizens of sister states, and
that that obligation does not extend to the exercise of government power. But Laycock would derive these rules from constitutional text and the structural needs of the federal union. He
thinks that Brilmayer's broader political theory is only marginally relevant to their shared conclusion.

P

ROFESSOR Brilmayer argues that citizens of one state are
not entitled to full rights of political participation in other
states, but that they are frequently entitled to demand that other
states treat them equally with the other states' own citizens.1 This
thesis is so obviously sensible, so inherent in the structure of the
federal union, that it is hard to believe it is controversial. Yet like
so many proponents of common sense these days, Brilmayer feels
obliged to defend herself against simultaneous attack from two
directions.
I agree with the thesis; indeed, I find it easier to defend than she
does, and in some ways I would carry it further. But in some ways
I would state it more narrowly. And even though we agree on the
broad statement of the thesis, we emphasize quite different points
along the way, and disagree on some of them. In this Commentary,
I will restate the thesis and the supporting argument.
Brilmayer's thesis follows from the structure of the federal
union. Citizens of one state cannot vote or hold office in another;
this conclusion follows from the decision to preserve the states as
separate political entities. In nearly all other matters, states must
treat citizens of sister states equally with their own; this conclusion
follows from the countervailing commitments to equality and na* A. Dalton Cross Professor at Law, The University of Chicago. J.D., 1973, The University of Texas at Austin.
Lea Brilmayer is my friend, co-author, and former colleague; it is a pleasure to build on
her work. I understand that she may think I am building in the wrong direction.
I am grateful to Mark Gergen, Sanford Levinson, L.A. Powe, William Powers, Michael
Sturley, Jay Westbrook, and Louise Weinberg for comments on earlier drafts, to Thomas
Schwartz for suggestions about the political science literature, and to Debbie Backus for
research assistance.
1. Brilmayer, Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a PoliticalPhilosophy of Interstate Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 389, 402 (1987).
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tional unity. The exceptions to the second half of the thesis are
few, and are themselves defined by the needs of the union.
It is not necessary to explore more fundamental questions of political philosophy, nor is it very helpful. The relationship among
the American states is fundamentally different from the relationship among independent nations, and the casual equation of domestic and international examples2 is an error. We are not committed to unity with foreign nations, and our relations with them are
not restricted by a privileges and immunities clause, 3 a full faith
and credit clause," a ban on war and diplomacy, 5 a Supreme Court
with authority to decide disputes between states,6 or any of the
other features of our Constitution. Our rules and practices for
dealing with foreign countries must allow for the possibility of political and economic regimes wildly different from our own. But our
rules for dealing with sister states presuppose that in every case,
we are dealing with a regime that has a republican form of government,7 is bound by a common set of constitutional rights, and
shares a common legal and political tradition.
Sound political philosophy must treat these situations quite differently. Any philosophy that considers these two situations together must proceed at such a high level of abstraction that its
conclusions can be easily modified or overridden by the more specific needs of the federal union or the realities of lawless foreign
regimes. Analogies from international law are at most suggestive of
hypotheses about interstate relations. Often the international analogy simply highlights a problem that the union was designed to
solve. Any hypotheses from international law must be tested
against the needs of the federal union and the positive law of the
Constitution.
If I understand her correctly, Brilmayer would not disagree with
my argument for her thesis. She offers a more general and philosophical argument in the alternative, in hopes of persuading readers who are unimpressed by anything so mundane as positive law
or the federal structure. If she persuades anyone, I should be grateful. But I do not find her additions to the argument helpful. Her
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 399-400.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. § 1.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. art. IV, § 4.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. amends. I-IX, XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
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political philosophy is interesting as a matter of general democratic
theory. But it is so far removed from the particular system of interstate relations adopted in the United States that, for me at
least, it has no explanatory power within that system. Sometimes
philosophical inquiry is more fundamental, but sometimes, it is
just further afield.
I also fear that the flight to philosophy may be harmful. If the
problem is that some theorists ignore positive law or the federal
structure, to argue with them on their own terms may tend to legitimate their enterprise. Political philosophy is useful in filling in
the large interstices of our Constitution. But it is illegitimate when
offered on its own authority, displacing or overriding the Constitution we actually have.' Thus, I much prefer to support Brilmayer's
thesis by examining the structural needs of our federal union and
the express constitutional provisions that created the union and
addressed those needs.
In addition to emphasizing the needs of the union, I give more
weight than Brilmayer does to the theory that discrimination
against outsiders is suspect. Her quarrel with that theory is aimed
at the excesses of some of its supporters. Properly understood, that
theory is fully consistent with her thesis.
I.

SHAPING: THE RIGHT OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITY

Brilmayer summarizes her thesis with a distinction between
shaping and sharing. She says that visiting nonresidents are not
entitled to shape political choices, but they are entitled to share in
the benefits, and obligated to share in the burdens, of the choices
that are made.1 0 The shaping and sharing formulation is catchy,
but as she appears to recognize," it is not quite right.
A.

The Exercise of Government Power

Outsiders are not wholly excluded from the shaping of political
choices. They have all the rights of political participation except
for voting and holding office. Most important, they have the same
speech rights as local citizens and may direct their speech to political issues. They may march in the streets, lobby the legislature, or
9. See Laycock, Constitutional Theory Matters, 65 TEx. L. REv. 767, 773-75 (1987);
Powell, ConstitutionalLaw as Though the Constitution Mattered, 1986 DuKF L. J. 915, 925.
10. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 401-02.
11. Although she speaks generally of shaping values and of exclusion from the political
process, all her examples deal with voting. Id. at 399-401.
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buy political advertising on local television. They may contribute
to campaign funds for candidates or referendum issues. No corporations can vote or hold political office, so in-state and out-of-state
corporations have identical rights to shape political choices. Legislators are generally more receptive to in-state interests, but that
deference is not a matter of right. Everyone has a right to speak;
no one has a right to be listened to. Organized out-of-state groups
exercise their right to speak extensively and sometimes effectively.
Groups from all points on the political compass invoke these
rights: not just General Motors and the American Tobacco Institute, but also Common Cause, the Sierra Club, and the United
Auto Workers.
Thus, the distinction is not between shaping and sharing, but
between a particular contribution to shaping and everything else.
What is special about voting and holding political office? The restriction of voting and office holding to the residents of each state
is essential to the states' existence as separate polities.12 The decision to preserve the states as separate polities requires the identification of boundaries that determine who is and is not a member of
each polity. If every American were a full member of the polity in
all fifty states, apathy 'about distant matters would be the only
source of political separation among the states. Apathy would suffice for some voters and some elections, but not for all. Political
activists would vote in many states, especially in highly visible senate races, and the constitutional structure would be defeated.
Thus, the logic of the constitutional structure is that, at any
given time, each of us is a member of one and only one state polity.
The rule for allocating persons to polities is residence. The fourteenth amendment makes that allocation explicit: every citizen of
the United States is also a citizen of the state in which he resides."
This explains why there must be some political distinction between citizens of different states, but it remains to explain why the
line is drawn at voting and office holding. Why are those rights,
and only those, reserved to members of the polity? The answer is
that the entrance to the voting booth marks the line between attempting to persuade the holders of government power and actually exercising government power. Political speech attempts to per12. Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 387 (1979).
13. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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suade. It may succeed, but it may also be ineffective or even wholly
disregarded. Speech has no binding consequences.
Votes may not be disregarded, and they do have binding consequences. The state must count every vote, the votes must be in
some sense equally weighted, 4 and the majority of votes directly
determines the policy of the state or the identity of the office holders empowered to make that policy. The individual voter exercises
a proportionate part of the state's power to govern. Demonstrators,
lobbyists, advertisers, stump speakers, and campaign contributors
do not. The direct exercise of governing power is reserved to members of the polity. That is why nonresidents are allowed to speak,
but not to vote. 5
This justification is functional as well as formal. It is true that a
clever person who writes a persuasive television ad, or a wealthy
person who funds it, can have far more influence than he could
have by casting a single vote. But the wealthy person could have
even more influence if he could import large numbers of outsiders
to vote for his position. Such "colonizing" of voters was allegedly
common before the development of modern registration systems.1 6
In the 1850s an unknown number of Missourians1 7 voted for slavery in Kansas-some accounts say thousands. 8 The perceived illegitimacy of the results contributed to the creation of rival state
governments and the armed violence of "Bloody Kansas."' 9 It has
been alleged that several thousand Philadelphia "hoodlums" cast
the decisive votes in New York that elected Benjamin Harrison to
20
the Presidency.
14. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For other possible meanings of
equally weighted votes, see Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS 375
(1981).
15. Cf. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 282-83 (1985) (state
cannot restrict practice of law to state citizens, because lawyers do not exercise government
power); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728 (1973) (same reasoning with respect to requirement
of national citizenship).
16. Goldman, Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NAT'L MUN. REV. 6, 6-7 (1956) (quoting J. HARRIS, REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES (1929)).

17. A. CRAVEN,

THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR

361 (2d ed. 1957).

18. P. SMITH, THE NATION COMES OF AGE 1099-100 (1981).
19. Id.; A. CRAVEN, supra note 17, at 361.
20. Goldman, supra note 16, at 7. Philadelphians may well have voted in New York, but
this was only one element of a thoroughly corrupt election. See S. LORANT, THE GLORIOUS
BURDEN: THE HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO JAMES EARL CARTER, JR.406-08 (1976); E. ROSEBOOM & A. EcKES; A HISTORY
OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 108-11 (4th ed. 1979); Wesser, Election of 1888, in 2 HISTORY OF
AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1789-1968, at 1615, 1651 (A. Schlesinger ed. 1971).
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Such invasions of the local electorate are intolerable. They are
different in kind from an out-of-state ad or campaign contribution.
Local voters may reject the message of an ad campaign; if they
accept the message and vote accordingly, that is their decision and
not the advertiser's. But if the deciding votes are cast by visiting
outsiders, the choice of local voters is overridden, and the resulting
decision is not that of the polity. This is why a residence requirement for voting has been thought "necessary to preserve the basic
conception of a political community."'" Holding political office is
an a fortiori case.
Even if limitation of the franchise to resident citizens were
merely conventional,22 the framers of our current constitutions
shared the convention. The federal Constitution requires Senators
and Representatives to be citizens of the United States and inhabitants of the state from which they are chosen. 23 The President
must be both a natural-born citizen and a long term resident of the
United States.2 The right to vote is left to the states,25 subject to
some federal constitutional protections; those protections are limited to citizens of the United States, 26 and to the "inhabitants" of
each state.2 7 State constitutions routinely limit voting to resident
citizens.28
21. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972).
22. See Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH.L.
REV. 1092, 1110, 1125-35 (1977) (questioning the limitation with respect to resident aliens,
but not with respect to nonresidents).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.2; id. § 3, cl.3.
24. Id. art. II, § 1, cl.5.
25. Id. art. I, § 2, cl.1; id. amend. XVII, § 1.
26. Id. amend. XIV, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
27. Id. amend. XIV, § 2. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (exclusions from
franchise expressly authorized in § 2 of fourteenth amendment are insulated from review
under § 1).
28. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1986-87, at 208 (1984),
lists twenty states with no residence requirement for voting. But this is error in all twenty
cases. See Arkansas: ARK. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. amend. LI, § 10(b), 11(a)(2); Connecticut: CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Delaware: DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2, 2B; Florida: FLA.
CONsT. art. VI, § 2; Georgia: GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, para. 2; Hawaii: HAW. CONST. art. II, §
1; Iowa: IOWA CONST. art. II, § 1; Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.101 (West 1979);
Maine: ME. CONST. art. II, § 1; Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 51, § 1 (West
Supp. 1987); Missouri: Mo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Nebraska: NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 1;
New Mexico: N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 1; Oklahoma: OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1; South
Carolina: S.C. CONST. art. II, § 4; South Dakota: S.D. CONST. art. VII, § 2; Texas: TEx.
CONST. art. VI, § 2; Vermont: VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 42; Virginia: VA. CONST. art. II, § 1;
Wyoming: WYo. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Gerald Rosberg reports that all states now require United States citizenship for voting.
Rosberg, supra note 22, at 1100. Nearly half the states let aliens vote at various times in the
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B. An Unnecessary Issue: The Diversity Argument for the
Existence of States
Brilmayer's explanation of residence requirements for voting
goes well beyond that issue; she also tries to explain why we have
separate states in the first place. She says that creating separate
polities and limiting political participation to residents fosters diversity, which is good for everyone. If Texans have different values
from people in Connecticut, both states should be able to act on
those values without dilution by meddling nonresidents. Yalies can
enact their Connecticut values at home and enjoy the locals when
they visit elsewhere.2
A Texan must obviously recognize the force of such claims.
Texas was really sovereign, not just fictionally so, and the Alamo,
the Revolution, and the Republic are unparalleled symbols of state
identity. The Lone Star flag still flies over thousands of public and
private buildings; a visitor from Yale once told me he had never
seen the flag of Connecticut. But despite such diversity among the
states, Brilmayer's point is both overstated and unnecessary to her
thesis.
Her diversity argument would be better adapted to her overbroad formulation about exclusion from the political process than
to the narrower exclusion from voting and holding office. There are
very substantial differences in political climate between Texas and
Connecticut, but neither state's values are insulated from the
other's. Both states watch the same national television networks
and read the same national magazines and newspapers, and both
states contribute journalists to those media. 30 Texas and Connecticut businesses lobby for their interests in the other state. Some
accounts would have it that three men from Connecticut died at
the Alamo.3 ' Brilmayer herself migrated from Connecticut to
past, often as a means of attracting new settlers, but none have done so since 1926. Id. at
1093-100.
29. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 400.
30. Walter Cronkite was a Texan. Someone must have come from Connecticut.
31. Alas, it may be that no one from Connecticut had such foresight. George Lewis
Baker and Samuel Robbins, both of Connecticut, are listed among the heroes of the Alamo
in A. Williams, The Siege and Fall of the Alamo 197, 202 (1926) (M.A. thesis available in
Perry-Castafieda Library, The University of Texas at Austin). But there are many false
claims to such an honor, and it appears that neither Baker nor Robbins was actually there.
Both are omitted from the more definitive list in A. Williams, A Critical Study of the Siege
of the Alamo and of the Personnel of its Defenders 292-353 (1931) (Ph.D. dissertation available in Perry-Castafieda Library, The University of Texas at Austin). They are also omitted
from the list in W. LORD, A TIME TO STAND 214-19 (1961).
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Texas and back again, and Jack Getman has since moved from
Yale to Texas (but not as the proverbial player to be named later).
Connecticut heiresses marry Texas ranchers, 2 and George Bush is
allowed to wander between the two states at will. Whatever the
cost to Texas values, we make little effort to preserve them uncontaminated by outside influence.
Americans do value diversity among the states, but we plainly
have strong countervailing values. Where Brilmayer sees welcome
diversity, Gerald Neuman sees discrimination that must be justified. 33 Too much diversity once led us into civil war; the resulting

constitutional amendments sharply and deliberately reduced diversity. Revolutions in transportation and communication have vastly
accelerated the trend to integration and homogenization. The vast
expansion of the federal government reflects a series of political
choices to do more and more things at the federal level, a choice at
odds with preservation of state diversity. State government may be
obsolete when corporations can coerce state policy choices by
threatening to move jobs and investment elsewhere. 4 For individuals, most interstate moves are dictated by employment chances
rather than political values. For many, the principal significance of
federalism is standing in line to get a new driver's license and auto
registration. State diversity will either survive these integrating
forces or it will not, but the legitimacy of denying voting rights to
nonresidents does not depend on the outcome.
Brilmayer need not take on the burden of showing that states
are a good thing. The original decision to preserve the states had
little to do with political theory and everything to do with experience. Despite weaknesses that some feared would be fatal, the
states were familiar and widely-trusted units of government. The
proposed federal government was unfamiliar, untested, and dangerous, but it promised to correct for the states' weaknesses. The
fight was over whether the federal government's potential benefits
were worth the risk; abolishing or consolidating the states was
Gordon C. Jennings did die at the Alamo, and one source credits him to Connecticut.
(undated brochure distributed to pilgrims and tourists). But more serious scholars trace him only as far as Missouri.
A. WILLIAMS, supra, dissertation at 324; W. LORD, supra, at 217.
32. Reinhold, On a West Texas Ranch, the Twain Not Only Meet but Marry, N.Y.
Times, July 1, 1987, at Cl, col. 1 (nat'l ed.).
33. Neuman, TerritorialDiscrimination,Equal Protection,and Self-Determination, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Farney, Nebraska, Hungry for Jobs, Grants Big Business Big Tax Breaks
Despite Charges of 'Blackmail,' Wall St. J., June 23, 1987, at 60, col. 1 (S.W. ed.).
DAUGHTERS OF THE REPUBLIC oF TEXAS, THE STORY OF THE ALAMO
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never a viable option. The states existed as separate polities before
the Constitution, and the framers were wholly incapable of changing that.
We can debate whether we would choose the same structure today, after two hundred years of experience with both levels of government. But that debate would be relevant only to proposals for
the most fundamental constitutional amendment in our history.
The Constitution we have preserves the states as separate polities,
but also federates them into the larger polity of the union. The
logic and needs of that structure, not broader political theory,
drive the constitutional solutions to the problems of relationships
between states and citizens of other states.
II.

SHARING: THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL UNITY AND

EQUALITY

The Federalists who pushed through the Constitution faced the
daunting task of creating one nation out of separate states, and of
doing so without abolishing those states. Much of the Constitution
addresses that task; many of its provisions are obviously designed
to foster national unity. 5
The key clause for present purposes is the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, which provides that Americans visiting a
sister state are "entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens." 36 Visiting citizens of sister states must be treated as citizens;
they cannot be treated as aliens or foreigners. I believe the clause
is universal in its scope and absolute in its terms, subject to only
those implied exceptions that are dictated by the needs of the
union. 37 The Supreme Court's view is narrower: states can discriminate with respect to unimportant things,38 or for substantial and
35. Some of these provisions are noted in the text accompanying notes 3-6. For a more
extensive collection, see Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 361-62 (1981).
36. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.1.
37. I hope to develop this thesis in a subsequent article. The exception for voting and
office holding has been explained in Part One of this paper. The exception for subsidized
social welfare services avoids serious free-rider problems that would inhibit all states from
providing such services in the first place. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 487, 522-23 (1981). The exception for inspections and quarantines
serves a national interest in containing infectious disease and is contemplated by constitutional text. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Brilmayer explains the rationale of the exception
for domiciliary choice of law rules that do not disadvantage citizens of sister states.
Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 412-13.
38. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 378-88 (1978).
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closely tailored reasons. 39 Even on that view, the clause is a sweeping commitment to the equal treatment of citizens of sister states.
That commitment is essential to national unity.
Suspect class analysis is a second and independent reason for
courts to narrowly construe exceptions to the clause and to scrutinize their application strictly. Brilmayer's attack on process theory
seems at times to condemn all suspect class theory. ° But I do not
think she means that, and I am sure she should not mean that.
Properly applied, suspect class theory provides strong reason for
vigorous judicial enforcement of the privileges and immunities
clause.
The essential contribution of suspect class theory is factual. Citizens of sister states are not allowed to vote or hold office at any
stage of the political process that produces local law. Equally important, humans universally tend to form groups and to denigrate
the qualities and interests of other groups." Finally, legislatures
are relatively unresponsive to the interests of persons who cannot
vote and are not part of any group with members who can vote.
These observations supply neither a normative principle nor a
principle of positive law. From the observation that legislators are
unresponsive to the interests of outsiders, one cannot deduce a rule
that outsiders must be treated equally with insiders. The observation that outsiders are likely to be victimized would be irrelevant
in a polity with no general commitment to equal treatment. To
that extent, Brilmayer is right that the exclusion of outsiders from
voting does not prove that they should receive special protection
from discrimination.
But our polity has both a normative and positive commitment to
equal treatment. The normative commitment is stated in general
terms as a self-evident truth in the document that declares our existence as a separate polity: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal .
",42 The positive commitment is stated in general terms in the equal protection clause.'
Most relevant for present purposes, it is stated with specific refer39.
40.

See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1985).
Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 393-94, 398-99, 402-09.
41. See, e.g., G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 29-67 (1954); Burnham, The
Changing Shape of the American Political Universe, 59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 7, 26 (1965).
42. Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This document is not to be confused with Declaration of Independence (Tex. 1836).
43. "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ence to citizens of sister states in the privileges and immunities
clause. And in that context, the general norm of equality is
powerfully reinforced by the need for national unity.
The implementation of our commitment to equality should be
informed by observations about the likely treatment of outsiders
whose political influence is sharply limited. The likely behavior of
legislators should inform both the drafting and interpretation of
constitutional protections. The risk of discrimination against citizens of sister states was a reason for the framers to include the
privileges and immunities clause. And it is a reason for courts to be
skeptical of claims that apparent discrimination against outsiders
is in fact justified by some nondiscriminatory reason.
Thus, the full statement of the suspect class argument is as follows: The privileges and immunities clause commits each state in
general terms to treat citizens of other states equally with its own
citizens. In working out the details of that commitment, and in enforcing compliance, courts should take account of what they know
of the workings of the political process. The usual political
processes are predisposed against citizens of other states, because
of their inability to vote and their status as outsiders. Thus, discrimination against citizens of other states is especially likely to be
unjustifiable in terms consistent with the commitment to equal
treatment stated in the clause. Courts will best implement that
general commitment if they treat all such discrimination as
suspect.
Nothing in this argument assumes that nonresidents are entitled
to vote locally. That they cannot vote locally is not a "process defect." 4 The argument does not assume that such persons should be
able to vote; rather, it assumes that they cannot vote and inquires
into the proper consequences of that. I doubt that anyone has misunderstood this; several privileges and immunities scholars have
noted the point. 5
44. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 399; Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 438-39 (1982).
45. See, e.g., Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in ProtectingIts Own, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 173, 189-90 (1981); Simson, supra note 12, at 387; Varat, supra note 37, at
520-21 (1981). Brilmayer's criticism is most applicable to Eule, supra note 44, at 437-43, but
it seems quite unlikely either that he would extend his argument to voting or that he would
think that his unwillingness to do so undermines his conclusions about commerce. The only
article that extends the argument to voting is Rosberg, supra note 22, arguing that resident
aliens should be allowed to vote because aliens are a suspect class. But even Rosberg would
not extend the argument to nonresidents. Id. at 1110.
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"Process defect" is a label introduced to constitutional law by
scholars who were troubled by the tension between our written
constitution and some supposed natural law of unlimited democracy. These scholars have attempted to minimize the substantive
elements of constitutional law; John Ely's book is the best known
example .

His argument that all or most constitutional violations

result from process defects, and that the Constitution does not
commit us to any substantive rights or values, was implausible
even in its original context. 47 The argument is even less plausible

in the context of discrimination against citizens of sister states, but

48
he did not make the mistake Brilmayer seems to accuse him of.

Citizens of sister states are guaranteed equal substantive treatment without being guaranteed equal rights of political participation. Their right to equal treatment is not a procedural right, and
their exclusion from full political participation is not a process defect, but their procedural exclusion is a reason to be suspicious of
laws that arguably violate the substantive right. Brilmayer is right
that outsiders are not entitled to vote, and given our general commitment to equality, the suspect class theorists are right that outsiders' inability to vote is a reason to treat as suspect all legislation
that discriminates against them. The two arguments are fully
consistent.
As Brilmayer correctly notes, true process defects require that
the process be fixed. When black adult citizens were denied the
right to vote, that was indeed a process defect, and the remedy
required that we create and enforce their right to vote.4 9 But this

process defect was also part of the reason for treating all discrimination against blacks as suspect.
I do not understand Brilmayer to disagree with the factual
claims of the suspect class argument. That is, I do not understand
her to claim that Connecticut legislators care about Texans as
much as they care about their own constituents, or to deny that
they would be delighted to raise revenue with a tax that falls only
on citizens of other states. Her discussion of externalities in state
policymaking 50 usefully cautions against inferring too much from
46. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). See Laycock, supra note 35, at 356-58.
47. See, e.g., Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutionalTheories,
89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Laycock, supra note 35.
48. See Ely, supra 45, at 189-90.
49. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 409 n.33, 416. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
50. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 402-09.
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this insight, but that caution is relevant only to a different
problem.
The bulk of her paper is about disparate treatment of citizens of
sister states." Her discussion of externalities is relevant only to
facially neutral laws that impose costs on citizens of other states.
The distinction is not merely formal. The Supreme Court has been
far more deferential to facially neutral laws than to facially discriminatory laws,5 2 and there is good reason for that.
Brilmayer develops the possible justifications for laws that burden outsiders. She reminds us that externalities run both ways:
state regulation imposes costs on interstate commerce, and hence
on citizens of other states, but interstate commerce also imposes
costs on the states through which it passes.5 3 Second, and I think
more originally, she notes that balancing costs and benefits from a
national perspective does not wholly solve the problem. Disagreements about the proper scope of regulation may arise because different states have different values-different degrees of willingness
to exchange public health, safety, or convenience for cheaper goods
and services. 5 She doubts that the federal government can act on
a single set of national values, 55 but in any event, Congress is better suited than the courts to strike the balance in close cases.
Thus, she concludes, "the Court should be extremely wary of inquiring too closely" into laws that seem to externalize costs."
Her insight is sound with respect to facially neutral laws. Her
insight weighs against, but does not negate, the countervailing insights that the states are likely to gerrymander regulation in a way
that externalizes costs, 57 and that there is something more than
"faintly unsavory" about that. 58 The privileges and immunities
51. "This Article is about only a small subset of the problems of interstate relations,
namely interstate discrimination. Under what circumstances may nonresidents be treated
differently from residents?" Id. at 393.
52. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981) (collecting cases).
53. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 404 (citing Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960)).
54. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 406-07.
55. She seems to think the values of each state must be considered separately, id. at 19,
but that is a false difficulty. When the decision is made at a national level, state lines can be
ignored. Any determination of collective values involves difficult summing problems, but
they are no more difficult in this context than in any other.
56. Id. at 408.
57. See Eule, supra note 44, at 437-43; Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1114-15
(1986); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 130-43.
58. See Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 404.
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clause does not reach 5such
facially neutral laws, but the dormant
9
commerce clause does.

Facially neutral laws that burden outsiders are often ambiguous
in both purpose and effect. They may flow from legitimate motives
and create legitimate benefits that justify the costs to outsiders, or
they may not. Courts can invalidate facially neutral laws that are
deliberately hostile to outsiders, or laws that impose costs disproportionate to their benefits, but only in clear cases. Such laws will
be upheld unless the burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.

' 60

The main rea-

son for such deference is that cost-benefit judgments are committed to legislators in the first instance. Brilmayer has adduced
another reason why that should be.
When a law is facially discriminatory, there is little reason for
deference, and Brilmayer's new reason for deference does not apply at all. When a law classifies in a facially discriminatory way,
any explanation based on legitimate differences in values fails to fit
the classification. Consider the Minnesota milk carton case. 1 If
Minnesota bans plastic milk cartons in favor of paper board, it
may be either conserving a nonrenewable resource or protecting its
paperboard industry. The odds are very high that both motives
were at work; this is one reason for courts to examine burden as
well as motive. 2 The discrimination between plastic and paperboard reeks of protectionism, but conserving nonrenewable resources is such sound policy that it is hard for the Court to find
either a protectionist motive or an unconstitutionally disproportionate burden on sister states. It is entirely appropriate that some
59. As to the commerce clause, see, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). There has been no need to
litigate whether the privileges and immunities clause forbids facially neutral classifications
with uneven incidence, because review under that clause would add nothing to review under
the commerce clause. In any event, it is textually plain that a facially neutral law does not
deny to citizens of other states any privilege or immunity accorded citizens of the acting
state. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (racially neutral classification with uneven racial impact is not a racial classification for purposes of the equal protection clause).
60. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1981) (quoting Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
61. The example is taken from Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456
(1981).
62. If the principal legislative motive was hostile or protectionist, then almost any resulting burden on interstate commerce should be invalid. There is no reason to defer to legislative balancing of interests when the balance is distorted by bad motive. But bad motive is
irrelevant without burden or discrimination; there must be harm to plaintiffs, not just bad
thoughts, to make out a constitutional violation. For the contrary argument that motive
counts and burden does not, see Regan, supra note 57, at 1094-98.
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courts would strike down the law and some would uphold it;6" the
case could legitimately be decided either way.
Now suppose that Minnesota banned cartons made of imported
materials and allowed cartons made of domestic materials. The
ambiguity would disappear. The only value that could explain such
a law would be a preference for Minnesotans. Discrimination on
the basis of that value is unconstitutional. The Court should not
defer to that value, nor should it defer to a rationalization that
could not explain the legislative classification. The facially discriminatory classification must nearly always be struck down.
Brilmayer also notes that states are legitimately concerned with
distributional consequences, and that these may sometimes justify
local regulation that is inefficient from a national perspective." I
fully agree. Having argued repeatedly that efficiency is not the only
value,66 I have no desire to take a different position here. But the
issue is not what kinds of considerations might justify a burden on
interstate commerce. The issue is: Who should judge the sufficiency of the justifications? A single state cannot reliably judge either the efficiency or justice of an interstate distribution of costs
and benefits. A national perspective does not ignore distributive
considerations; indeed, obvious distributive injustice is an important part of the objection to laws that discriminate against citizens
of sister states. States will rarely be motivated by a desire for inefficiency: no state sets out to reduce the gross national product. But
states may often be motivated by a desire to redistribute costs to
outsiders in ways that objective observers would condemn as unjust. Considering distribution as well as efficiency is fully consistent with the need to review state decisions from a national
perspective.

63. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979) (invalidating
statute), rev'd sub nom. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding statute).
64.

Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 405.

65. See Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEx. L. REV. 407, 40910 & n.13 (1985).
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OBEY THE LAW

As with so much of her work,66 one of the most valuable aspects
of Brilmayer's article is its treatment of interest analysis. 7 Brainard Currie's extraordinary premise that states are legitimately interested in the welfare of only their own citizens68 was a frontal
assault on the union. Brilmayer shows how this view is inconsistent
with any reasonable conception of fairness to citizens of sister
states. 9 In my judgment, Currie's view is inconsistent with the
constitutional commitments to equality and national unity, and it
violates the privileges and immunities clause. Brilmayer's duty of
sharing extends to rules of law.
The recognition that Curriean interest analysis is discriminatory
has long coexisted with the intuition that some choice of law rules
can legitimately refer to domicile. A major contribution of
Brilmayer's article is to reconcile these intuitions and mark the
line between them. She shows how application of Curriean interest
analysis to most interstate transactions creates a discriminatory regime of rules in which the outsider is worse off than he would be
under the law of either state.70 Domiciliary choice of law rules that
are acceptable even to territorialists, such as the rule that estates
are administered under the law of the decedent's domicile, do not
have that consequence. 7 In those cases, domiciliary law is applied
regardless of whether the estate or the local heirs are advantaged
or disadvantaged. That is consistent with the needs of the union
and with equality for citizens of sister states, and it is a legitimate
exception to the privileges and immunities clause. Applying the
rule that benefits the local litigant is not.
Brilmayer also usefully highlights the tension between Curriean
interest analysis and our expectation that visitors will obey local
law. 2 We can hardly expect visitors to obey our law when it hurts
66. Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985); Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A
Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555 (1984); Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate
Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH L. REV. 1315 (1981); Brilmayer,
Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REv. 392 (1980).
67. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 396-98, 409-13.
68. Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958).
69. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 396-97, 412-13.
70. Id. at 412-13.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 411-12.
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them without giving them the benefit of our law when it would
help them. Like any other unfairness in government, Curriean interest analysis undermines the legitimacy of government's demand
for obedience. The point may have more fundamental roots than
Brilmayer recognizes.
Brilmayer is concerned with justifying the power of government
coercion. Why is it legitimate to demand that citizens and visitors
obey the law? Because, she concludes, both citizens and visitors
receive the benefits of government."'
This states the relationship backwards. There is a quid pro quo
between subjection to government and entitlement to its benefits.
But subjection to government comes first, logically as well as historically. People create governments and endow them with coercive
power out of necessity-to preserve life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."4 Anarchy may appeal to a few dreamers and theorists,
but no human society has ever actually functioned that way.
Coercive government power must bind everyone within the jurisdiction: citizen and visitor, adult and child, competent and incompetent. The purpose of such coercion would hardly be served if visitors were free to kill, rape, and steal because they had not been
consulted in the writing of the laws. Thus, the power to coerce visitors is also derived from necessity. They must obey whether or not
they can vote, and whether or not they are treated fairly, lest government fail in its essential purpose.
People create governments out of necessity, but they immediately face the problem that governments abuse their power and
that there is no good way to decide who should be entrusted with
such power. The American solution has been to vest ultimate
power in the people collectively, to require government to treat
people equally, to disperse and limit government power, and to
guarantee fundamental rights. But recognition of the necessity of a
government with power to coerce logically comes first. If we did
not need government coercion, we would not need voting, equal
treatment, or individual rights.
Thus, the power to coerce is not granted because people have the
right to vote and share in government benefits. Rather, people are
granted the right to vote and share in government benefits because
73. Id.
74. See Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 13
& 17 (1651).
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the government has the power to coerce.7" It does not follow that
nonresidents can vote, for the reasons discussed in Part One. But
as Brilmayer argues, their obligation to obey strengthens the case
for treating them equally in all other things, including choice of
76
law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Commentators are obliged to develop their points of disagreement with the principal paper; they cannot just repeat the points
they like. The extent of disagreement between Brilmayer and me
should not obscure our essential agreement. We agree that states
owe equal treatment to citizens of sister states, and we agree that
that obligation does not entitle nonresidents to exercise government power. She expresses this as a distinction between shaping
and sharing.
Close attention to the structure of the union helps refine the two
concepts. The exclusion from shaping applies only to voting and
holding political office; it does not restrict attempts to influence
voters and office holders. The duty of equality in sharing has few
exceptions. Rules of law are one of the things that must be shared.
Curriean interest analysis is fundamentally inconsistent with
Brilmayer's duty of sharing; I believe it is also fundamentally inconsistent with national unity.

75. Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 1, at 398 ("The electoral relationshiparises because of
the political responsibility to govern fairly; the responsibility to govern fairly does not
arise out of the existence of an electoral relationship." (emphasis in original)).
76. Id. at 411-12.

